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The existence of a conflict of interest between the principal and the 
agent causes information asymmetry. This information asymmetry can 
be minimized by voluntary disclosure in the annual report. GCG 
factors, company characteristics, and financial distress are predicted to 
influence the extensive voluntary disclosure. This study aims to examine 
the effect of ownership dispersion, financial distress, the board size, 
CEO duality and age of listings on the extensive voluntary disclosure. 
Data population are basic and chemical industry companies listed on 
IDX for the 2015-2018. A purposive sampling was used as method and 
obtained 160 samples. This study used secondary data from annual 
reports. Data were analyzed by using the Multiple Linear Regression 
Analysis method. This study found that Ownership Dispersion and Size 
of the Board of Commissioners have a significant positive effect on 
Extensive Voluntary Disclosure. Whereas Financial Distress, CEO 
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In the era of globalization, relevant, 
complete, accurate and easily understood 
information is needed to support smooth 
decision making. Information revealed is 
related to the business continuity of a 
company and the returns expected by 
investors for investments in the company 
(Vernando and Halmawati, 2016). 
Information needed by investors and other 
stakeholders can be presented in the form of 
an annual report. Information needed by 
investors and other stakeholders can be 
presented in the form of an annual report. 
The annual report is a report on the progress 
and achievements achieved by an 
organization or company in a year. 
Information disclosed in the annual report 
can be divided into two; Mandatory 
Disclosure and Voluntary Disclosure. 
According to agency theory, the 
existence of conflicts of interest between 
principals and agents within the company 
can be minimized by the disclosure of 
additional information in the annual report, 
namely by voluntary disclosure (Allegrini 
and Greco, 2013). Voluntary disclosure is a 
disclosure that exceeds the minimum 
requirements for applicable reporting 
standards that are not mandatory, the 
company will usually take into 
consideration the benefits and costs arising 
from voluntary disclosure (Vernando and 
Halmawati, 2016).  
One of the problems related to 
disclosure in the company was discussed in 
one of the online news https:// 
bisnis.tempo.co on April 21, 2019, 
regarding PT. Garuda Indonesia (Persero) 
Tbk. The state-owned airline PT. Garuda 
Indonesia (Persero) Tbk, was asked to be 
more transparent in explaining its financial 
statements which had become polemic. In 
this case, what needs to be clarified is the 
realization of transactions which then give 
rise to claims (receivables) so that they can 
be included in revenue. This is what needs 
to be disclosed to the public whether the 
recording of accounts receivable is in 
accordance with the standard. 
Research on company characteristics 
as factors that influence the extensive 
disclosure has often been conducted, but 
not much of them also examines company 
characteristics, GCG, and financial distress 
as factors that can influence the extensive 
voluntary disclosure at the same time. In 
addition, previous research on the factors 
that influence the extensive voluntary 
disclosure reveals inconsistent results. 
Ownership Dispersion is one of the factors 
that influence the extensive voluntary 
disclosure. Ownership dispersion is the 
distribution of the portion of share 
ownership of publicly owned companies 
(Vernando and Halmawati, 2016). 
Vernando and Halmawati (2016) prove that 
ownership dispersion has a significant 





positive effect on the extensivevoluntary 
disclosure. Whereas research conducted by 
Oktriani dan Arza (2018) proves that 
ownership dispersion does not have a 
significant positive effect on the 
extensivevoluntary disclosure. Research 
conducted by Oktriani dan Arza (2018) is in 
line with research conducted by Wardani 
(2011). Furthermore, Nany (2012) found 
that public shares did not have a significant 
negative effect on the extensivevoluntary 
disclosure. 
Another factor that is predicted to 
influence the extensive voluntary disclosure 
is Financial Distress. According to Piatt dan 
Piatt (2002), financial distress is the initial 
stage before the occurrence of bankruptcy 
or liquidity due to a decline in financial 
conditions. Research conducted by Indriani 
(2014) shows that financial distress has a 
significant negative effect on the extensive 
voluntary disclosure. Whereas Vernando 
dan Halmawati (2016); Poluan dan 
Nugroho (2015) find that financial distress 
does not have a significant positive effect 
on the extensive voluntary disclosure. 
The size of the Board of 
Commissioners is also predicted to 
influence the extensivevoluntary disclosure. 
The board of commissioners is part of the 
organ of the company that has the duty and 
responsibility collectively to conduct 
supervision and provide advice to directors 
and ensure that the company implements 
GCG (KNKG, 2004). The size of the board 
of commissioners is a large number of the 
board of commissioners in a company. The 
more the number of the boards of 
commissioners in a company, the 
possibility of disclosure of financial 
statements is even broader, because of the 
large number of boards of commissioners, 
the increase in supervision also in the 
company. Poluan dan Nugroho (2015) 
prove that the size of the board of 
commissioners has a significant positive 
effect on the extensivevoluntary disclosure. 
However, research conducted by Rafifah 
and Ratmono (2015) shows the results that 
the size of the board of commissioners has 
no significant positive effect on the 
extensivevoluntary disclosure. 
In addition, CEO Duality is also 
predicted to influence the extencive 
voluntary disclosure. CEO Duality is 
someone who has 2 positions at once, as 
Chairman of Board (Board of 
Commissioners) and Chief Executive 
Officer (Board of Directors) in a company 
as stated by Booth, Cornett dan Tehranian 
(2002). The presence of CEO Duality in the 
company will be a conflict of interest where 
the CEO who is responsible for the overall 
corporate strategy is also involved in a 
position to evaluate the strategy (D‟aveni 
and Finkelstein, 1994). Al-Janadi, Rahman 
and Omar (2012) prove that the separation 
of CEO and Chair has a significant negative 




effect on the extensive voluntary disclosure. 
It means, companies with CEO duality 
provide more information than companies 
with the separation of the two positions. 
Whereas Allegrini and Greco (2013) found 
that CEO duality has no significant 
negative effect on the extencive voluntary 
disclosure. 
Furthermore, the factor predicted to 
influence the extensive voluntary disclosure 
is the age of listing. The age of a company 
listing is how long the company is listed on 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange as a 
publicly-traded company (Vernando and 
Halmawati, 2016). The longer the 
company's life, the company will likely 
increase the extensive voluntary disclosure. 
As the company is considered experienced 
and already knows what should be 
disclosed in its annual report. Previous 
research conducted by Hidayat (2017) 
proved that the age of listing had a 
significant positive effect on the voluntary 
disclosure index. Whereas Vernando and 
Halmawati (2016) found that Age of 
Listing had a significant negative effect on 
the extensive voluntary disclosure. This 
study is in line with research conducted by 
Wardani (2011) that the age of the 
Company has a significant negative effect 
on the extensive voluntary disclosure. 
Finally, the results of this study are 
expected to contribute to academics in 
developing future research. Also, this 
research can enrich references in the field 
of accounting, especially regarding 
extensive voluntary disclosure information. 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Effect of Ownership Dispersion on 
Extensive Voluntary Disclosure 
Ownership Dispersion is ownership 
of shares by the community. Ownership 
dispersion means that the public also owns 
a company for a portion of its shares (Booth 
dan Chua, 1996). The greater the 
percentage of shares owned by the public, 
the greater the public's control over 
company policy. Thus, the public requires 
more disclosure of information from the 
company concerned to monitor existing 
developments (Putri, Yuniarta and 
Darmawan, 2015). Several empirical 
studies have examined the relationship 
between Ownership Dispersion and 
extensive voluntary disclosure. Vernando 
dan Halmawati (2016), Nainggolan (2017), 
and Indriani (2013) prove that Ownership 
Dispersion has a significant positive effect 
on the extensive voluntary disclosure. 
Based on the description above, the 
hypothesis can be proposed as: 
H1: Ownership Dispersion has a significant 
positive effect on the extensive voluntary 
disclosure. 
 





Effect of Financial Distress on 
Extensive Voluntary Disclosure 
Platt dan Platt (2002) define 
financial distress as a stage of decline in 
financial conditions experienced by 
companies, which occurred before 
bankruptcy or liquidation. Based on 
Agency theory, companies that experience 
financial distress will present more 
information to the public to reduce the 
burden that will occur in the future and 
avoid bankruptcy (Gantyowati and 
Nugraheni, 2014). However, when the 
company is in a healthy financial condition, 
the company manager will convey 
information with more confidence because 
this condition can increase the value of the 
company. Research conducted by 
Immanuel dan Muid (2015) found that 
Financial Distress has a significant negative 
effect on the extensive voluntary disclosure. 
Based on the statement above, the 
hypothesis can be formulated as: 
H2: Financial Distress has a significant 
negative effect on the extensive voluntary 
disclosure. 
Effect of Size of Board of Commissioners 
on Extensive Voluntary Disclosure 
 
Corporate Governance in Indonesia 
is generally centered on the board of 
commissioners because the main task of the 
board of commissioners is to oversee and 
evaluate policy making and provide advice 
to the board of directors on the 
implementation of the policy. The greater 
the board of commissioners in a company, 
 
the supervision, evaluation, and 
implementation of policies by the directors 
will be more qualified so that the 
implementation can be in line with 
company objectives (Poluan dan Nugroho, 
2015). 
A large number of members of the 
board of commissioners are considered to 
be able to increase the extensive voluntary 
disclosure. A large number of 
commissioners can reduce the possibility of 
information asymmetry because they can 
contribute more to reducing distribution 
conflicts between agents and principals as 
stated by Chen and Jaggi (2000). Poluan 
dan Nugroho (2015) prove that the size of 
the board of commissioners has a 
significant positive effect on the extensive 
voluntary disclosure. Based on the 
description above, the hypothesis can be 
formed as: 
H3: The size of the Board of 
Commissioners has a significant positive 
effect on the extensive voluntary 
disclosure. 
Effect of CEO Duality on Extensive 
Voluntary Disclosure 
CEO Duality is someone who has 
two positions in one company, as a Board 
of Commissioners and a Board of Directors. 





Figure 2.1.Research Framework  
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In Agency Theory, CEO Duality can reduce 
the monitoring role of the board of directors 
over executive managers, so that it will 
have a negative impact on company 
performance (Elsayed, 2007). CEO is the 
role responsible for the company's 
operations, while the commissioner's job is 
to supervise and evaluate top management. 
Therefore, the separation of the two roles 
can increase the effectiveness of 
supervision,whereas in the role of duality, it 
is possible to create a conflict of interest 
(Johari et al., 2009) in (Chandra dan Devie, 
2017). Dissanayake and B (2019) found 
that CEO duality had a significant negative 
effect on the extensive voluntary disclosure. 
Based on this statement, the hypothesis can 
be proposed as: 
H4: CEO Duality has a significant negative 
effect on the extensive voluntary 
disclosure. 
Effect of Listing of Age on Extensive 
Voluntary Disclosure 
The age of listing is the period a 
company is listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX) as a public company and 
shows the company's ability to compete in 
the business world to maintain its business. 
Older companies will have more experience 
in publishing annual reports. Companies 
that have more experience will better know 
the needs of their constituents for 
information about the company (Oktriani 
dan Arza, 2018). This is because older 
companies have more experience in 
disclosing financial statements and are 
more understanding of things that have a 
positive effect on disclosure in the 
company (Albitar, 2015). Previous research 
conducted by (Oktriani and Arza, 2018) 
proved that the age of listing had a 
significant positive effect on voluntary 
disclosure. Based on the description above, 
the hypothesis can be formed as: 
H5: The age of listing has a significant 



















Population and Sample 
This research is a qualitative 
research with secondary data. This study 
chose the basic and chemical industry 
companies listed on the Stock Exchange as 
the object of research. The research sample 
was selected by using purposive sampling 
with the condition that the Basic and 
Chemical Industrial Companies 
consecutively disclose financial reports and 
annual reports on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange during 2015-2018, by using the 
rupiah currency and financial statements 
that have complete data for this research. 
Definition of Operational Variables and 
Indicators 
The variables used in this study 
consisted of the dependent variable (Y) and 
the Independent variable (X): 
1. Endogenous Variables: Extensive 
 Voluntary Disclosure (Y)  
2. Exogenous Variables: Ownership 
 Dispersion, Financial  distress  (X1), 
 Size of Board of Commissioners (X2), 
 CEO Duality (X3), Age of listing (X4). 
Extensive Voluntary Disclosure 
Voluntary disclosure is a disclosure 
that can be done freely by the company 
according to company interests that are 
considered relevant and supportive in 
making economic decisions that will be 
made by annual report users (Meek, 
Roberts and Gray, 1995). The 
extensivevoluntary disclosure in this study 
was measured by using Voluntary 
Disclosure Index (IPS) by: 
a. Giving a score for each dichotomous 
disclosure item. If an item is disclosed, 
it is given a score of 1 and if not, it is 
given a score of 0. 
b. The scores obtained by each company 
are then summed to get the total score 
for voluntary disclosure. 
c. Voluntary Disclosure Index (IPS) is 
obtained by omparing the total score 
obtained from the company and the 
total disclosure standard score in the 
annual report. 
Ownership Dispersion 
Ownership Dispersion is the 
ownership of shares by the general public 
that does not have a special relationship 
with the company against the shares of 
public companies (Vernando dan 
Halmawati, 2016). Ownership Dispersion 
variable is measured by using a percentage 
of the ratio between the number of shares 
owned by the public and the number of 
shares outstanding (Vernando and 
Halmawati, 2016). 
Financial distress 
Financial distress is a condition in 
which a company has difficulties in 
fulfilling its obligations to the creditor or an 
indication when the company is in debt 
restructuring caused by difficulties in 
 




paying its obligations (Andrade and 
Kaplan, 1998). Financial distress is 
measured by using the Altman Z "-Score 
model (Altman, Hartzell and Peck, 1998) 
which has been modified from the merging 
of four financial ratios. 
Size of the Board of Commissioners 
 KNKG (2004) revealed that the 
Board of Commissioners is part of the 
organ of the company that has a collective 
duty and responsibility to supervise and 
provide advice to directors and ensure that 
the company implements GCG. The size of 
the board of commissioners is measured by 
looking at the number of commissioners 
owned by the company (Poluan and 
Nugroho, 2015). 
CEO Duality 
CEO Duality is someone who has 2 
positions at once, as Chairman of Board 
(Board of Commissioners) and Chief 
Executive Officer (Board of directors) in a 
company (Booth, Cornett and Tehranian, 
2002). CEO duality is measured by using 
dummy variables. If there is CEO duality, it 
is given a score of 1, and if there is no CEO 
duality, it is given a score of 0 (Sitorus, 
Firli dan Ramadhan, 2017).  
Age of Listing 
The age of listing is the age of the 
company since it was listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) as 
publicly traded company (Vernando and 
Halmawati, 2016). The age of company 
listings is measured by calculating the age 
of the company from the initial date of 
listing on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
until the year of the study used (Vernando 
and Halmawati, 2016). 
Analysis Techniques 
 
The data analysis technique used in 
this research is Multiple Linear Regression 
Analysis with SPSS 25 software. The 
regression equation model in this study is: 
 
IPS = α + β1X1 + β2X2 + β3X3 + β4X4 + 
β5 X5 + e  
which: 
IPS = Voluntary Disclosure Index 
 
α = Constant  
β = Regression Coefficient  
X1 = Ownership Dispersion  
X2  = Financial Distress 
X3  = Size of Board of Commissioners  
X4  = CEO Duality  
X5  = Age of Listing  













Results and Discussion 
Analysis of Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1. Analysis of Descriptive Statistics 
 
  N Min Max Mean Median 
Std. 
Deviation 
IPS (Voluntary Disclosure 
Index) 
160 0.145 0.490 0.323 0.309 0.644 
OD (Ownership 
Dispersion) 
160 0.57% 51.91% 24650% 21.98% 14864% 
FD (Financial Distress) 160 -6.237 3.789.728 40.057 2.393 319.955 
UDK  (Size   of   the 
Board of Commissioners) 
160 2 8 4.13 4 1.656 
CEO Duality 160 0 1 0.49 0 0.501 
Age of Listing 160 1 29 19.43 22 7.952 
Valid N (listwise) 160           
Source : Secondary data processed, 2020 
 
   
Extensive Voluntary Disclosure 
The extensive voluntary disclosure 
proxied as the Voluntary Disclosure Index 
(IPS) shows a value between 0.145 to 0.490 
with an average value of 0.323 and a 
standard deviation value of 0.064. Thus, it 
can be concluded that the average value is 
greater than the standard deviation value, 
this shows the low variability of data 
between the minimum and maximum 
values. The lower the level of data 
variability, it can be said that the spread of 
data is normal. 
In addition, the extensive voluntary 
disclosure variable also has a good level of 
accuracy because the average value of 
0.323 is higher than the mean value of 
0.309. From these statistics, it can be 
concluded that the average level of 
voluntary disclosure in basic and chemical 
industry companies listing on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange in the 2015-2018 was 
30.91%, this result is slightly lower 
compared to the results by Andriyanto dan 
Metalia (2011) that revealed the average 
voluntary disclosure in high profile 
companies was 34%. However, the average 
area of voluntary disclosure in this study 
shows higher disclosure than the results by 
Andriyanto dan Metalia (2011) which 
proves that the average of extensive 
voluntary disclosure of low profile 
companies is only 27%. 
Ownership Dispersion 
Ownership Dispersion (OD) data 
shows values between 0.57% to 51.91% 
with an average value of 24.65% and a 
standard deviation value of 14.86%. Thus, 
it can be concluded that the average value is 
greater than the standard deviation value. 
 




This shows the low variability of data 
between the minimum and maximum 
values. The lower the level of data 
variability, it can be said that the spread of 
data is normal. Also, the ownership 
dispersion variable has a good level of 
accuracy because the average value is 
24.65%  higher  than  the  middle  value  of 
21.98%. 
Financial Distress 
Financial Distress (FD) data shows 
values between -6,237 to 3789,728 with an 
average value of 40,057 and a standard 
deviation of 319,955. The average value of 
40,057 indicates that most of the sample 
companies are not experiencing financial 
distress. Thus, it can be concluded that the 
average value is smaller than the standard 
deviation value. This shows the high 
variability of data between the minimum 
and maximum values. The higher the level 
of data variability, it can be said that the 
spread of data is not normal. Also, the 
financial distress variable has a good level 
of accuracy because the average value of 
40.057 is higher than the mean value of 
2.339. 
Size of the Board Commissioners 
Size of the Board of Commissioners 
(UDK) Data shows values between 2 and 8 
with an average value of 4.13 and a 
standard deviation value of 1.656. Thus, it 
can be concluded that the average value is 
greater than the standard deviation value. 
This shows the low variability of data 
between the minimum and maximum 
values. The lower the level of data 
variability, it can be said that the spread of 
data is normal. In addition, size of the board 
variable also has a good level of accuracy 
because the average value is 4.13 higher 
than the middle value 4. 
CEO Duality 
Duality CEO data shows a value 
between 0 to 1 with an average value of 
0.49 and a standard deviation value of 
0.501. Thus, it can be concluded that the 
average value is smaller than the standard 
deviation value, this shows the high 
variability of data between the minimum 
and maximum values. The higher the level 
of data variability, it can be said that the 
spread of data is not normal. In addition, 
CEO duality variable have a good level of 
accuracy because the average value is 0.49 
higher than the mean value of 0. Age of 
Listing Age of Listing data shows values 
between 1 and 29 with an average value of 
19.43 and a standard deviation value of 
7.952. Thus, it can be concluded that the 
average value is greater than the standard 
deviation value, this shows the low 
variability of data between the minimum 
and maximum values. The lower the level 
of data variability, it can be said that the 
spread of data is normal. In addition, the 





age of listing variable has an unfavorable 
level of accuracy because the average value 
of 19.43 is lower than the middle value of 
22. 
Classical assumption test 
Table 2 shows all the independent 
variables have a VIF value < 10 and a 
tolerance value > 0.10, it can be concluded 
that there is no multicollinearity in the 
research model. The results of 
heteroscedasticity testing using the Glejser 
test showed that all variables had 
significant values above 0.05, it can be 
concluded that the assumption is not the 
occurrence of heteroscedasticity in 
research. The results of data normality 
testing by using the Kolmogorov Smirnov 
test have a significant value of 0.200 > 
0.05, it means, the data are normally 
distributed. The autocorrelation test results 
showed that the Durbin-Watson (DW) 
value of 2.217, means there was no 
autocorrelation because the results showed 
the DW value of 2.217 was greater than the 
upper limit (du) 1.8063 and less than 4 - 
1.8063 (4-du). 
 Table 2. Classical Assumption Test Results  
      
Model Tolerance VIF 
Glejser Kolmo. Smirnov Durbin- 
Test test Watson    
      
OD 0.970 1.031 0.959   
FD 0.990 1.010 0.891   
UDK 0.949 1.054 0.363   
CEO 




     
Age of 




      
Note : 
 OD = Ownership Dispersion 
 CEO Duality = CEO Duality 
 FD = Financial Distress 
 
Age of Listing = Age of Listing 
UDK = Size of the Board of 
Commissioner 
Source: Secondary data processed, 2020 
            Hypothesis Testing Results 
In table 3, the adjusted R-square value 
obtained is 0.127 or 12.7%. That means, 
Ownership Dispersion, Financial Distress, 
Size of the Board of Commissioners, CEO 
Duality, Age of Listing can explain the 
Voluntary Disclosure variable of 12.7%, 
while 87.3% is a variable that is not 
contained in this research. The results of the 
F-test conducted in this study can be seen if 
the significant F-value (0,000) < 0.05, 
meaning that the Ownership Dispersion, 
Financial Distress, Size of the Board of 
Commissioners, CEO Duality, and Age of 
Listing have a significant effect on the 
Extensive Voluntary Disclosure. In 
conclusion, the regression model in this 
research is good and worth for this research. 
 




Based on table 3, it can be 
concluded that the results of the t-test are: 
1. The sig. t-value of Ownership 
Dispersion is 0,000 <0.05 with positive 
direction, thus H1 is accepted. It 
means, Ownership Dispersion has a 
significant positive effect on Extensive 
Voluntary Disclosure. 
2. The sig. t-value of Financial Distress is 
0.469> 0.05 with a positive direction, 
thus H2 is rejected. That is, the 
amount of Financial Distress does not 
have a significant positive effect on 
Extensive Voluntary Disclosure. 
3. The sig. t-value of Size of the Board of 
Commissioners is 0.002 <0.05 with a 
positive direction, thus H3 is accepted. 
That is, the size of the board of 
commissioners has a significant 
positive effect on the extensive 
voluntary disclosure. 
4. The sig. t-value of CEO Duality is 
0.767> 0.05 with a positive direction, 
thus H4 is rejected. That is, CEO 
Duality has no significant positive 
effect on Extensive Voluntary 
Disclosure. 
5. The sig. t-value of the Age of Listing is 
0.435> 0.05 with a negative direction, 
thus H5 is rejected. That is, the age of 
the listing has no significant negative 
effect on Extensive Voluntary 
Disclosure.
Table 3. Hypothesis Testing Results   
Hypothesis Std β Unstd β SE t-count p-value Results 
       
Constant  .263 .018 14.276 .000  
H1: OD → IPS .290 .001 .000 3.860 .000 Accepted 
H2: FD → IPS .054 1.089E-5 .000 .726 .469 Rejected 
H3: UDK→IPS .234 .009 .003 3.081 .002 Accepted 
H4: CEO Duality → IPS .022 .003 .010 .296 .767 Rejected 
H5: Age of Listing → IPS -.060 .000 .001 -.782 .435 Rejected 
Adjusted R Square = 0,127  
Sig. F = 0,000  
Note: UDK = Size of the Board of Commissioners 
OD = Ownership Dispersion CEO Duality = CEO Duality 
FD = Financial Distress Age of Listing = Age of Listing 
  
Source:Secondary data processed, 2020  
Discussion  
Effect of Ownership Dispersion on 
Extensive Voluntary Disclosure 
Based on the findings, the 
Ownership Dispersion has a significant 
positive effect on Extensive Voluntary 
Disclosure. It is suspected, companies with 
large public ownership will disclose more 
company information because of the public 
demand for information that is in the 





company is also large. The greater the 
percentage of shares owned by the public, 
the greater the public's control over 
company policy. Thus, the public requires 
more disclosure of information from the 
company concerned (Putri, Yuniarta dan 
Darmawan, 2015). 
The results of this research support 
the research conducted by Indriani (2014), 
Vernando and Halmawati (2016), and 
Nainggolan (2017) which prove that 
Ownership Dispersion has a significant 
positive effect on the Extensive Voluntary 
Disclosure. However, the results of this 
study are not in line with the study of 
Wardani (2011) which proves that public 
ownership does not have a significant 
positive effect on voluntary disclosure. 
Effect of Financial Distress on Extensive 
Voluntary Disclosure  
Based on the results of the study, 
Financial Distress has no significant 
positive effect on Extensive Voluntary 
Disclosure. In this study, companies that 
are experiencing financial distress and non-
financial distress are still not interested in 
making voluntary disclosures. It can be 
known from the average of voluntary 
disclosures that are still classified as low, 
which is 30.91% with the largest disclosure 
on environmental indicators of 98, 125%, 
and the lowest disclosure on the indicator of 
value-added information that is equal to 
0%. This is allegedly due to the cost and 
benefit factor, where if the company will 
provide additional information, it will 
require a significant amount of costs, and 
usually, the benefits of these costs are lower 
than the costs required. Hence, the company 
is reluctant to disclose because the benefits 
obtained by the company are not 
comparable to the costs that must be 
incurred by the company to disclose. 
This study is in line with research 
conducted by Vernando and Halmawati 
(2016) which proves that financial distress 
has no significant positive effect on the 
extensive voluntary disclosure. However, 
this study is not in line with the research of 
Immanuel dan Muid (2015)which proves 
that financial distress has a significant 
negative effect on Extensive Voluntary 
Disclosure. 
Effect of Size of the Board of 
Commissioners on Extensive Voluntary 
Disclosure 
Based on the results of the study, the 
size of the Board of Commissioners has a 
significant positive effect on Voluntary 
Disclosure. A large number of members of 
the board of commissioners are considered 
to be able to increase the extensive 
voluntary disclosure. A large number of 
board of commissioners can reduce the 
possibility of information assimilation 
because they can contribute more to reduce 
distribution conflicts between agents and 
 





principals (Chen and Jaggi, 2000). Thus, 
the greater number of board of 
commissioners is considered to be able to 
increase the extensive voluntary disclosure. 
The greater the number of boards of 
commissioners, the easier it is to supervise 
and monitor the performance of 
management in the company. This study is 
in line with the research of Poluan and 
Nugroho (2015) which proves that the size 
of the Board of Commissioners has a 
significant positive effect on the extensive 
voluntary disclosure. However, the results 
of this study are not in line with the 
research by Rafifah and Ratmono (2015) 
which proves that the size of the Board of 
Commissioners has a significant positive 
effect on Voluntary Disclosure. 
Effect of CEO Duality on Extensive 
Voluntary Disclosure 
Based on the results of the study, 
CEO Duality has no significant positive 
effect on ExtensiveVoluntary Disclosure. In 
this study, the company with the presence 
of CEO duality or not, the company is still 
not so interested in a voluntary disclosure. 
It can be known from the average voluntary 
disclosure that is still relatively low. This is 
because in a company with CEO duality or 
not, there is still a conflict of interest 
between shareholders, management, and 
creditors. Differences in interests are one 
reason management tends to hide or not 
disclose the information to the company's 
external parties. This is done to prevent the 
risk of conflicting interests between 
management, shareholders, and creditors or 
external parties of the company. 
This study is in line with the 
research of Yuen et al. (2010) which proves 
that CEO Duality has no significant 
positive effect on Voluntary Disclosure. 
However, this study is not in line with 
research conducted by Dissanayake and B 
(2019) that CEO Duality has a significant 
negative effect on ExtensiveVoluntary 
Disclosure. 
Effects of Age of Listing on Extensive 
Voluntary Disclosure 
Based on the results of the study, the 
age of listing has a significant negative 
effect on the extensive voluntary disclosure. 
In this study, companies with an aging 
license or a young age of listing are still not 
interested in making voluntary disclosures. 
It can be known from the average voluntary 
disclosure that is still relatively low. It is 
suspected, companies with older age or 
companies with young age have fears of 
free riding, where certain parties use 
potential information in the company for 
purposes that are not good for the company 
concerned. For example, companies prefer 
to make voluntary disclosures less because 
they do not want to lose competition due to 
the disclosed information which weakens 





the competitiveness of companies. After all, 
the information is used by competitors to 
strengthen their competitiveness. 
This study is in line with research 
conducted by Hidayat (2017) and Oktriani 
and Arza (2018) who found that Age of 
Listing had no significant positive effect on 
ExtensiveVoluntary Disclosure. However, 
this study is not in line with study 
conducted by Indriani (2014) which proves 
that the age of listing has a significant 




Based on the results of the study, it 
can be concluded that Ownership 
Dispersion has a significant positive effect 
on Extensive Voluntary Disclosure. Large 
public shareholding can increase the 
extensive voluntary disclosure, but the 
young or old age of listings does not tend to 
do voluntary disclosure. This is because 
there are public demands for company 
information and public control over the 
company is large, as a result of its shares in 
the company. 
The size of the Board of 
Commissioners has a significant positive 
effect on Extensive Voluntary Disclosure 
but CEO Duality has no significant positive 
effect on Extensive Voluntary Disclosure. 
As a large size of the board of 
commissioners, it will increase oversight of 
company management so that management 
will make more voluntary disclosures. 
Multiple positions as directors and 
commissioners do not influence voluntary 
disclosure. 
Financial Distress has not a 
significant positive effect on Extensive 
Voluntary Disclosure. As financial distress 
affects voluntary disclosure. This is due to 
the consideration of costs and benefits. 
Whether the benefits obtained by the 
company will be proportional to the costs 
incurred by the company for these benefits. 
This research has implications for 
the need to expand research variables. 
Future studies are expected to add other 
independent variables that are predicted to 
significantly influence the voluntary 
disclosurevariable, including leverage. The 
higher the leverage of the company, the 
greater the creditor pressure on the 
company to make more extensive voluntary 
disclosure. Close monitoring of creditors 
will encourage companies to be more 
transparent in making voluntary 
disclosures. The practical implication of 
this research is that companies are expected 
to be more transparent and extensive in 
making voluntary disclosures, so as to 
reduce the possibility of information 
asymmetry between company management 
and stakeholders. Also, it can facilitate the 
decision-making process for those who 
need it. 
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